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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DA "'liD STEELE, a minor, by and 
through his Guardia Il 7 Ad I_Jitem, 
CARL STEELE, and 
CARL STEELE, 
P lai nti ff s ( tn( l A. pP e llan.ts, ~. Case 
~vs.-
} 
( No .. 9064 
BR"'{ AN WILKINSON, OR-Ali J. I) 
'VTLKINSON, and 
ZION TvfOTOR1 INC., 
De fen da;nts and Respondents.. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S~r.A·T·ET\J[ENT OF FACTS 
'This is an action involYing personal injuries arising 
out of a collision bet~\reen Defendant's automobile and 
Plaintiff. On the 28th day of ~\ugust, 1954, Defendant 
Oral Bryan Wilkinson was proceeding in a westerly 
direction along 4800 South Street near 788 East in Salt 
Lake County, driving an automobile which 'vas o\vned by 
Defendant Zion lvlotor, Tu('. In so driving Oral Bryan 
Wilkinson had the permission of an officer of said do-
1 
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fendant corporation.. Defendant Oral J. "'\Vilkinson had 
previously signed a Utah driver's lic-ense applica tlon of 
said Defendant () ra1 Bryan 1\Tilkins on . 
.. A.s the Defenda11t ~s automobile neared 788 ~ast~ 
Plaintiff~ a small boy aged 4 years~ ran or toddled across 
thB 8t.reet irJ front of it. Defendant'~ aulomobi1e, '~Thic-h 
1vas traveling about 2-"7.5 miles per hour, struck Plaintiff 
H s he ran from the front yard of l1is borne, passed a tele-
p1tonc pole at the side of the road, and entered the street. 
Plaini.jff covered a diHtance of approximately 17.1 feet 
from the telepho1le pole to the center line of the street, 
and theu a bout three feet beyond the center line to i he 
point of inlpact. r~laintiff 'vas hit by the left front fen-
der of Defendant\~ automobile. 
fJ1l1c collision oecurrcd at approximately six o 'cloek 
in t.h~ afternoon. 11. vras light and vi~ibii.ity waR clear and 
unobstructed. The street was a hard-top road; it was dry 
and in good dri vi11g eond1 t.ion. 
PI aintiff received severe darn age to Iris brain and 
~he IH~rve fibers 'vhich control the left Ride of his body. 
A 8 a result of the accident, Plaintiff was unable to \valk 
nr talk eifeetively, and suffered from freqtu~n 1. tempo~ 
rary lapses of consciousness. Plaintiff suffered great pain 
1vbieh COt1tinued afto1· the aceident, and medical testimony 
\VH~ to t.he effect i.hat at least part of l1is condition was 
permanent. 
A. t. the trial the jury returned a general verdict for 
the Defr. ndn n 1.. Plain tiff moved for a new trial in De-
2 
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tern] ~(·r of 1955~ This motion was not argued until April 
of 1959, n t \vlli<·ll time it 1\:-as denied . .L.:\.ppeal o,vas subse-
q llP n 1l y t nken t.o this eou l't. 
rFhe detailed t.P~timony introduced supports all of 
these i'ac1.s. '':(~ \\·ill refer to the details of the t(~st[mony 
as t1 l c· y become a pplieablr in Rta ting our argumcn is. 
ST ~:\ T~FJ~1J~~N1., OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
DEFENDAN1'"S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED NEGLI~ 
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
PoiNT II. 
THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE CLElffi vVEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE~ 
Ar TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT 
CLEARLY EST .ABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT'S 
NEGLIGENCE 'V\rAs THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
PLAINTIFF~S !~JURIES~ 
B. DEFENDANT)S OWN ST.A.TEMENTS~ COR-
ROBORATED BY OTHER RELIABLE TESTIMONY~ 
ILLUSTRATE THAT HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
PoiNT Til. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ALLOWING DR4 
HARRIS TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT. 
A. DR. HARRIS DID NOT QUl\LIFY AS AN 
EXPERT~ AND IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY. 
3 
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B. DR. HARRIS ANSWERED HYPOTHETICAL 
QUESTIONS WHICH WERE BASED ON FACTS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE4 
PoiNT IV .. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO .. 9 IS ER-
RONEOUS, MISLEADING~ CONFUSING, AND IS IN 
ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SET FORTH THE COR-
RECT STANDARD .. 
PoiNT V .. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS TO PARAGRAPH NO.2, INSTRUCTION 
NO.3, IN THAT DEFINING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE ABSTRACTLY IS CONFUSING AND MISLEAD-
ING TO THE JURY AND RAISES AN INFERENCE 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEG· 
LIGENT. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURTtS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 8~ NO .. 9~ 
NO .. 10 AND NO .. 11 ARE ERRONEOUS~ CONFUSING, 
AND MISLEADING AND IN ERROR BECAUSE THEY 
PLACE UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
PART IN THE INCIDENT AND INFER THAT THE 
ACCIDENT WAS INEVITABLE~ 
ARGUI\fENT 
PoiNT I .. 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED NEGLl-
CENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW~ 
It \vas clearly established at trial, ,v]thout. contradic-
tion, that Defendant did not see the Steele infant prior to 
4 
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.r; 9~ /tp'l,.Jr~ 
t.lu; time of impact (R .. }..3:., ):Q.B--, 1.4;- 7-8}4 The fact that the 
road vl.n. y ahead of Def en dan t, bet,veen I 1 is ear and the 
point of impact~ 'vas clear and unobstructed for a distance 
of up to 1.50 feet, depending upon the position of his car 
at the moment the child stepped onto the roadway~ Vlas 
both admitted by Defendant and clearly established by 
testimonv of otl1er ,vjtnesses~ as vtas the faet that the ff;J'f};'s dry, and visibility was excellent (R. ~· {4~ 
Th1tS it remained only for the court to determine if 
these facts constituted a violation of a legal duty. It if.; 
normally held that sue.h a determination is one for the 
jury. That is, the jury must determine, in cases of daub(, 
if the conduct of the defendant failed to measure up to 
the standard the reasonable prudent person \\,.ould 
adhere to. VanCleave <r. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 166 PI 2-d 
244 ( 1946) I HoYveYCr ~ it is equally clear that if the con~ 
duct of the defendant so clearly violated his legal d u t.;-· 
as to leave nothing for the determination of tl1e jury, then 
the court must rule upon that fact and it is error to sub-
mit it to jury determination. E. g. Orlea.ns " .. · Pla:tf 1 90 
L .. S. 676 (1878). See also ilforby v~ Rogers, 122 Utah 540:r 
252 P. 2d 231 ( 1953). 
The general standard of attentiveness imposed by 
the Ia,v is summarized in 2 Restatement,. Torts ~289~ Cotn-
ment gr Attentiveness: 
u I ... it is necessary that the aet.or shall exercise 
an attentiveness closely related to that ,\rhich is 
necessa1·y in order that his senses may per.c,eive 
5 
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those circumstances which are capable of such 
]Jerception .. ~ ~ 
See also 2 H a·rper and J antes, :lrhe La1c of 1rot-ts 
~~ 16.5 (1956) : 
"Cnles~ at least the acto1· has a physical impair-
rnent of his senses or is insane ol' a ebild, l1e must 
1u; suffieiently attentive to hiR surrormdlngs to per-
ceive \~.rhat the reasonable man would; he will be 
held to sec the obvious and hear the clearly 
audible .. ~~ 
The fact that the Steele ehild vl"onld have been vis-
ible~ sttutding in the open highway under conditions of 
good v isibi l.i ty,. to one v{}IO l1 ad bothered to 1 oo k or had 
been attentive to 1\,.hat he wa.s looki11g at is so obvious 
as to hardly require the statement .. Mere failure to see 
him \Vas the breach of a legal duty .. 
"' ·Tl1is eourt is, ho\vev(.)r, firn1ly eommittcd to the 
rule that in case there is a duty o\\ing to the plain-
t.i iT to maintain a lookout, then, if the person 
charged with causing tl1e injury in tl1e exer(·i~e of 
ordinary care and vigilance eould have discoveTcd 
the perilous situHtion of the r..omplainanl in time 
to have averted injuring him, the la"~ presumes 
that the person charged 1vith negligenee ~a,\~ 'vbat 
he ought to have seen, and actual d i ~eo\" c~ fJ:' i~ not 
neeessary. '~ (Citing additional Utah cases) Rich-
ards v·. Pa.lacc Laund1·y ( 1o.t 55 l.~tah 409~ 186 Pac~ 
439, 444 ( 1919). 
See also E.louJ;her-n Californ-ia Freigh-t Dine.s v .. San Diego 
.E~l Ry .. , 66 (;al~ .L-\ pp. 2d U 7~-, 102 P. 2d 470 ( 1944) ; 0-rn.n. Y~ 
J( raft Phe·nix Cheese Corp., 324 IlL i\.pp~ 463, 58 N~E .. 2d 
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7:Jl ( 1 ~)44) (" 1\ person is charged 'vith the duty of look-
~ 
ing and ~eeing ~ lLings that are obviously visible. n) 
Perhaps the elea rest n pp liealion of t.hiR doctrine to 
au a 11 t on1obile accident is that in Pfisterf!r v. K e:~;., 218 
Ind. 521, 33 ~~. F~. 2d 330 (1941) - a case involYi.llJ-!' t.hr 
'\\- ronp.+f u l dea t.h 0 r a 15-year-old boy as a resu1 t of his 
being struck by defendant-'s automobile as he \valked 
along the road at about dusk, hut in good visibility: 
"It haR been many times said that it i~ negli-
gent to fail to Ree or hear that which you coulrl see 
or hear, by the exerciRe of ordinary .and reasonable 
care~ and for that. reason the la\v attaches tl1e same 
legal consequences for not ~r.cing or hearing as it. 
does i.f in fact you did see nnd hear. 
"Tu cases of this kind there is a period of time 
as the parties approach each other~ 1\rhen it m~1y 
be said, a .. 1 a 1nattr.r of lau,, that neither party is 
guilty of negligence, and on the other hand a la t.er 
period 'vhen it may be said, as a Jnatter of lnn~1 thnt 
both parties are r1egligent. ~ ~ ( En1p basis added) 
This stHtement covers the situation in the ir1stant case~ 
es~ept to the extent that l1ere onl-y one pari.y eonld have 
been negligent, since the infant Steele was not of ~nffi­
cien t age to he ~ u i 1 t y of neg~ igent e.o1 Ld n cl ~ 
Where the inattentiveness of the driver has heen 
-clearly e~tablishcd, it has al8o l1er.n frequently held that 
the question of \Vhether sueh inattentivenesR r.on~tituteR 
negligence is not one for submission to the j11ry~ but 
must he ruled upon by the court .. The United Statet-; S11-
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preme Court so ruled in Norther .. n Pacific R. R. v. Free~ 
tna·n, 17 4 U. S. 379 ( 1899), holding as follows ! 
" ... tl1e deceased approaehed a. railway crossing 
\vell known to him; that the train was in full vie,v, 
that, if he had usod his senses7 l1c could not have 
faiJed to see it; and that, notwithstanding this, the 
aceidcnt occurred. Judging from the common ex-
perience of men, there c.an be but one plausible 
solution of the problem how the collision occurred. 
He did not look; or if he looked 7 he did r1ot heed the 
\varning, and took the '~hance of crossing the track 
before the train could reach him. In either ease he 
vlas clearly guilty of contributoTy negligence. 
"Upon the 'vhole, we are of opiniou that the 
testimony tending to sho,v contributory negligcJ1ce 
on tho part of the deceased \Vas so conclusive that 
nothing remained for the jury:~ and that the de-
fendant Vr"'as entitled to an instruction to return a 
verdict in its favor.'' ( p. 384} 
See also ._(·]rhofteld v. Chicapo 2 Jlilu·aukee lE ~St. Paul Ry., 
114 U. S. 615 (1885) (Vlhere a person on a sleigh could 
have seen a train (~oming and \Vas 8.truck hy the tTain and 
injured he was guilty o£ co tl tributo ry negligence and the 
tria 1 eo uld could direct a verdi cL) 
The Utah court adopted the usual rule on attentive-
ness in .Jlin-gus v. Olsso-1~; 114 Utah 505~ 201 P. 2d 495 
(1949) in disposing of the question of contributory negli-
genee in relation to a fatal accident at a cross,valk: 
,; 'On this ~-.vidence~ it must be said as a matter of 
la·w that deceased Pither failed to look, or having 
looked, failed to see what he should have seen." 
(Emphasis added) 
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See also Sine v. Salt J~akc .T·ra·nsportation Co., 106 l..,.tah 
289, 147 P. 2d 875 {1944); Weemg Bros. v. Man-ning, 1 
Utah 2d 101, 262 P4 2d 491 (1953); Fa-rkas v. H all·iu:ell~ 
136 Conn. 440, 72 A. 2d 648 ( 1950). 
Furthermore, the duty to look where one is going and 
be generally attentive to high,vay conditions is set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. ~41-6-80 (1953}: 
"'Every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care 
to av~oid colliding 'vith any pedestrjan upon any 
roadway * * * and shall exercise proper pre-
cantio_n upon observing any child or any incapaei-
tated person upon a road,vay. n 
A teRt as to when sueh negligenrr may be ruled upon 
by the court, as a matter of law, is r.Iearly set ont in 
Du-ggan v. Bay f{tate St. Ry., 230 1Iass. 370J 119 X. ID. 767, 
760 ( 1918) : 
''v-Vhere from the facts \\o·hic.ll a-re undisputed 
or indisputable, or sho\\"'ll by evidence by 'vhic-h the 
plaint iff is hound, only one r·ational in fe rt~T1 ce can 
be dra,vn and that an inferenec or contributory 
negligence or "\Vant of due c.are, then the question 
of due care or contributory negligence is one of 
la'Vi-,.. for the court and a verdict for the defendant 
should be directedr" 
See also Sto1ze v. Btlullen-, 257 ~lass~ 344, 153 N~ E. 565 
(1926); Morby v. Ro.qers1 122 Utah 540, 252 PL 2d 231 
{1953)~ 
Applying these standards in this case, it must he 
remembered that (1) the defendant did not see the child 
as it traversed a clear and unobstructed path of 20.1 feet 
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from the telephone pole to point of impact, and, ( 2) there 
\V(~re no obstructions to ivsionJ or other just 1 114J blc rea-
sons for Defendant not seeing. rrhese facts \Vere ad-
mitted b j' Defendant~ testified to by otb er eoinpetent wit-
nesses at the scene, supported by the physical examina-
tion of the acc-ident scene by tvlo expericn<.~ed police offi-
eers, and no evidence "V!t'as introduced tending to contr8d1ct 
t.hr~~e facts. Therefore, a :fair-minded pcr!-:;Olt eould not 
logieally maintain that Defendant did not have an oppor-
tuTlity to see th,e ehild standing in Lhe road,vay, had he 
lookerl, a11d under the cases cited, his failure to look or 
failure to see did not. eonstitut.e an exeusc.. Tl1c e.ourt 
sh ou] d direct a "\rerdict to this effect. SubmiRsion of thl s 
question ~.o the jury ''las error~ In~tructing the jury in 
a manner \\'"hich led them to believe thel;),_Z~..,any ques-
tion asto Defendant's negligence (R~ ~?,Instrur.­
tlons 3, 4, 9, 10 and 11) further compounded the error~ 
PoiY·r 11. 
frHE v-ERDICT IS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The verdict of the trial court is subject to the further 
eritiei~In 1 hat it. is clearly against the weight. of e\idence, 
v iev.red in a manner most favorable to said verdict. It 'vas, 
iherefore, mandatory that the trial judge direct a verdict 
:in favor of plalntiff. 
As l1cretofore demonstrated~ Defendant"s breacl1 of 
hiR legal duty to maintain a proper and vigilant lookout 
'vas so cleu rly established that the case could not go to 
10 
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the jury on that question. The only other rationale 
\\'11 ieh could possibly justif~.r the submission of the case to 
the jllry 1 s t1lnt the Defendant ~8 negligence, though ad-
mit.tcd aud cleur]y established, \Vas not tlu; direct and 
proxirna t.c result of the infant, David Steele ~.s, injuries. 
E\·en thiH c.onclusiouJ ho,~rever~ is so elear.ly negated by 
the Defendant's o \V n evidence that the jury verdict can-
not 1H· upheld ev(~n if Defendant's testimony it-; viev.:red in 
a light most favorable to the..m . .L\.ppreciation of this faet 
is predicated upon an understanding of expert testimony· 
introduced at trial, 'vhie-h represents the only testimuny 
questioning causation. 
A. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT}S EXPERT 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT D~EFENDANT'S 
NEGLIGENCE Wi\S TriE PROXIMATE CAVSE OF 
PLAINTIFF~s INJURIES. 
FIRST: The factR \Yhich the Defeudant~s expert, Dr. 
Franklin S. Harris, reli-ed upon in re:1ching his cone1u-
si ons on the possibility of stopping th c \\'il kin~on auto-
mo bile \Vere aR follovtR : 
(1) Dr .. Ila rr]s began hiA calcu1ations by eomputing 
t}Je length of time "\Yhieh the Steele infant probably spt:nt. 
traveling aeross the roadvtay to the point of .impneL The 
time element was arri vrd at by comparing the distaneR 
traveled with the speed the rhild 'vas running. rl11H; dis, 
tancc from the telep l1 one pole at the left of t.he road to the 
center line wal:l measured fl t 17.1 feet (R. ~. Dr. Harri;;; 
then estimated the speed v{llirh a child woul(] probably 
run at 6 miles per hour, and concluded that it would hike 
11 
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1.9 seconds to cover the roadway from the telephone pole 
to the cc·nter tine only. 
(2) He then attempted to establish the distance 
from the point of impact Defendant's car 'vas when the 
child stepped onto the road. This figure \~:as arrived at by 
e stiroa ting that a ear traveling at the speed Defendant's 
car \vas probably traveling (27 ~ miles per honr, rather 
than the 25 miles per hour suggested by other witnesses) 
'\.V011ld covrr 40 feet per 8econd. It is thus apparent that 
by the expert's figurest which are most favorable to him, 
the car \v.ould have been at least 76 feet a'A~ay. llowevcr~ 
point of impact was not on the c~nter line, as Dr .. Harris 
/rt:J 
P:lj~um~d, but three feet beyond the center line (R. -%"; 
~,.H~ thus giving 0.3 seconds more time to observe (still 
using the figures most favorable to Defendant) or a total 
of 2 . .:1 secondg which would place the car 88 feet from 
the point of impact at tluJ time Plaintiff stepped onto 
the road\vay. 
( 3) ~rhe expert next a tt em pte d to estimate ho~T roucl1 
distance it 1\Tould have taken for the car to ~top. This 
stopping distanct 'vas a composite or total of three dif-
ferent factors. (1) Actual braking time -~vas put at 32 
feet. If the expert had stopped here his estimate would 
probably hav(~ been fairly accurate,. for, as will be shown 
later, the 32 foot figure wn.~ fairly elose to t11c distanc-e 
actually required by Wilkinson to stop after he became 
a\vare of the danger. To this figure, however, the expert 
adds (2) reaction time, which he stated would on on an 
average c.onsume an additional30 feet (3} He next ''sug-
12 
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gests," merely, a11 additional factor referred to as 0 per-
ception time} n \vhich is never reduced to a figure, but 
merely left to the speeula t.i on of t l• e jury ,,. i thou t any 
meaningful basis on which to evaluate it. rrhis was no 
doubt confusing~ Furthermore, taking the expert '.s o'vn 
figures, it is evident that only 62 feet of the 88 feet avail-
able to Defendant \Verc consruned in reaetion and brak-
ing (again, considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Defendant) leaving a totail of 24 feet for the 
intangible, perception, if it can be considered by the· jury 
at alL It is thus apparent that a reasonable pers011 acting 
under t.hese or .similar circumstances could have and 
should have stopped i_f he had ~ooked. Any other finding 
is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
SECOND~ But how, then, did the jury reach its ver-
dict fIt may have decided there "\Vas no negligcr1ce~ v,~hich 
would amount to error as a matter of la,v. It might also 
have relied upon the mere statement of tlH) expert that the 
car could not have stopped, but such a conclusion is not 
.supported by the facts he relies upon, even accepting his 
own interprctatio1l of them. ~.fore probably~ ho~rever~ the 
jury was i11fl ue11ced lly a confusing, devious~ and entire 1 y 
irrelevant series of discussions between the expert and 
counsel for Defendant vrhich could have no ott1er purpose 
but to mislead and confuse. This can btfst be demonstrat-
ed by quoting from the record. ..;\fter counsel asked the 
expert to place the vehicle at its appro.xima te location 
~hen the ch¥1-~tepp~d onto th~ street (promptly ob-
Jected to, R. ., ~ testtmony continued as follo1rvs: 
13 
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'' Q. (~an };ou sho\v us "?~-There the different obj eets 
'vould be~ Dr. llarri8 r 
.A.r T·he length of this car scales about seventeen 
feet so if Vle ean use this us a. little measuring 
thing - let's see~ let's fu.":· t take one second 
fit~st ~ 
Q. Yes. 
_A_. ~sinee there won't be very mueh difference in 
o-ne 8ecoJ-ui. 
QL 011.·e secon-d h~-re, t-hen hov{ far back would 
this bo 1 
_.:\_+ 1\r ell that is fort.y feet. Forty feet would be-
\'{cll it would be not quite to tl1i.s mark.'' {Em-
pLW3is added) 
After setting up this l.typot1Jctica.1 distanc:e, based on one 
second ~s iiu1c rather than the 2.2 seconds v,rhich actuallv 
... 
elapsed from the time tlu: ehild stepped into the f.:.treet 
unti1 the time of impact, the expert Hnd C{)UrJse1 continue 
on as if this arbitrary tim.e V{as the actual time: 
~' Q. NOV/ just take in reaction time only, that is 
the time that a person decides to do something. 
~ O\V what is the average reaction time in driv-
ing a vehicle to stop it f 
A. rro get the foot on the brake and stop it~ 
Q. rrhat is \vhat they mean by reaction. Th-e foot 
from the aecclerator or to the brake is there-
action timet is it not, and that is three-quar-
ters of a secondL 
A. Yes. 
Q. A ear traveling twenty-five miles an hour trav~ 
els ho\f much in three-quarters of a second? 
14 
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A. Thirty feet . 
• • 
;-\. Thirty fn<.~t. }7" es~ in one second it travels 
forty feet~ \vhich is a quarter of a second more. 
It travels ten feet every quarter of a second. 
Q. Now you have studied t.he braking time and 
ability to Rtop the car, the maximum ability to 
stop a car in the distance it takes to stop it, 
have you not' 
A. Yes. 
Q. A car going twenty-seven and a half miles an 
hour can stop in 'vhat minimum distance 1 
There is then art extended discussion of co-efficient pro b-
lems, vrhich serves to confuse the jury further~ partieu~ 
larly \vhen injected at this point. 
~'" Q. X O\\·· ·what isJ .Dr. Harris, t.hc shortest dis-
tanr-e in the circum.stances which exist at 4800 
South about 788 East of a car going t\vcnty-
soven and a half miles an hour 1 
Ar I think I remp_mber the number but. let mr 
make sure I remember it right. Yes., thirty-
t\vo feet. 
Q~ Thi rtJ·-t~No feet 1 
A. l~ CS~ 
Q. So computing both reaction time and the dis-
stance ·you trnvel in reaction time Hnd the 
distanre it takes to stop the vehiele from 
\vhere you hxYe marked 1 "\vith your initial.~, 
the total of thoHe two \vould be considered tho 
rcartion time the Rhortest point in Vlr'hich th1 s 
vPhicle could be stopped is that correct~ 
1\... I~et "'s see~ the react.ion tin1e plus the-
15 
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Q. Plus the stopping distance~ 
A. The reaction time plus the braking distanc.e 
'vould be the distan-ce it would take to stop, 
yes. 
Q. And that would total sixty-two feet, would 
it not f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how far was the outline of the car No. 1 
from the point ~,;X" of Bethany Pearc-e~ 
''A. Well that is forty-two feet. It actually isn't 
from the ~'X"; it is from this vertJeaJ. 
Q. Just forty-two feet. And it would take a ve~ 
hicle totaling reaction time sixty-two feet ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q~ ~to come to a stop 7 
A. Yes. This is from the time that the driver de-
cides to do something. 
Q.. X ow in regard to this ability to stop a car and 
various factors, there is a third factor,. is there 
not, Dr. liarris 1 
A .. Yes. 
Q.. And what is thatT 
A. Well, it is usually called perception time. 
This entire discussion, it must be emphasized, was rep-
s en ted as reflecting the co ndi ti ons of the accident but in 
faet '''"as based only on a hypothetical dealing with less 
than one-hal£ of the actual time involved. This must have 
been misleading to the jury. Sueh hypothetical discus-
sions c.ould not have any possible relevance~ 
16 
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'riiiRD: One additional fact vras established hv the 
test inlony of the expert which renders the verdict of the 
jury entirely unconscionable~ Dr. Harris testifies, based on 
his O\vrt figun .. \s, that the r.hild "r.ould l1ave traveled oniy 
four feet ruote had it continued across the road while De-
ft·Tldant applied maximum braking power. His caleula.tions 
\n.luld then plac-e the child four feet into the west-bound 
lane of traffic at the time of impact. He concludes that 
since the car is slightly less than six feet in 'v'idth, the 
driver could not have avoided hitting the child. Hov{~ 
ever, as indicated above, the point of impact \Vas actua]ly 
three feet into the westbonnd lane rather than on the 
eenter line.. Four feet added to the three feet the child 
wa.s already into the lane 1\'"0uld plac-e it seven feet be~ 
yond tlu~ eenter line, at least~ and in a position 'vhere it 
could have been ca~ily avoided. This is 1 of c.oursc., accept-
ing the expert's conclusion that Defendant could not 
have stopped, which has already been demonstrated 
faulty. 
B. DEFENDANT'S OWN STATEIVIENTS, CQR .. 
ROBORATED BY OTHER RELIABLE TESTIMONY, 
ILLUSTRATE THAT HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
E1.ren assuming that the statements of the expert 
could~ in some- respects~ support the position of t.hc De-
fendants, it is nevertheless clear that su('h eonclusions 
were improperly introduc-ed and cannot be considered in 
the face of clear statements to the contrary hy perecptive 
witnesses at t.l1c scene of the accident. Tn this regard it. is 
to be noted that the introduction of such evidence was 
17 
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prope1~~9nd repea.}~dlv objected to at the t~iaL_ (SeeR. 
pages ~ a:l/,.,l~Jt, ~ In each case, ObJCC.ttons were 
surnmarily denied~ Facts established at trial illustrating 
that the n cgligent conduct of Defendant '-Vas the actual 
and proximate cause of the child .ts injurieR are as follows: 
FIRSt}_~: Defendant did. not see the child. Defendant, 
Bryan "\l{ilkinson, made the follo\ving staterucnts in re-
sponse to direct examination ; 
'~ Q. \Vhen \\'as ihe first time you SR\V David 
Steele f 
.lt. "\VeU, all I saw V{as just a blur, just a blur, and 
1.l1(~ n I hcatd it and stopped immediately. 
Q. Ho~T far \\·ere you from tl1is blur that you 
stated ·you saw1 
~4.... T don 't know+ 
Q. llo\v far 'verc you from this blur when you 
turned your head haek to t.l1t~ "\vest tov,;ard the 
road·? 
A. T don~t knovr, I vrould be about--
Q~ \Vas it ahout t\vO inches from the front fender 
like you testified to September 15th 1 
A.+ '{ ou mean that \vas ho\\·' far the blur 'vas a-\~?ay 
front~~~e feq,~ you mean? Yes, about that.'~ 
(R·+~and4-S-)s 
Tlris Ht.atement \Vas consistent \\~ith ~tatements Defend-
a 11 t made to in ve8.!la'a ting officers iinmediately folloVt1ing 
the accident. (R. 13-and ~ 
18 
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~E( ~()X J): Defendant 'vas able to stop his er-u· \vi th-
in a Yery short distance following impact.. Testimony on 
this point is quite consistent,. illustrating its reliability. 
Helen PearcP, v..-Jlo observed t.lte accident stated that the 
distance the car trn veled follo,ving impact ''v{aSJJ 't fat·.~, 
(R.~ Defendant himself stated immediat~~ly follow--
ing the accident, that the ear traveled .a bout iivc feet 
follov{ing impact (R·~ If# .A. t trial Defendant testified 
that the car traveled between one and one-half and t\vO 
eu r lengtl•s follovting impact. Kent Gaufin~ a paH~engcr 
in the ("art also c~timatcd the distance of travel follo,ving 
impaet rd. one and one-half to t\vO car lengths, while the 
other passenger, 1\.rley Kurtz,. estimated one to one and 
one-half car lengths. Thus the most conservative estimate 
was five feet, and, taking the figure most favorable to 
defendant notwithstanding his own estimate of five feet, 
the greatest dist.anee V{Ould have been two car lengths .. 
\\1hilc the lengtl1 of tl1is car ~;-as not definitely established, 
Defendant's expert did state t.hat model ear used for dig-
play· purposes in making eRtimateA was scaled at seven-
teen feet and fairly represented Defendant.'s automobile 
(R. ti!if/. Sueh statements were not objer.ted t.o, and tak-
ing them as the figure most favorable to Defendant, the 
greatest estimated distance of travel follo,ving impart \\'3f-t 
thlrty-four feet. 
It must be carefullv noted that the distance of travel 
+' 
estimated here takes into account all re1cvant factors~ 
They 'verc tl1e a-ctual dtf.)tances traveled by th-e ear, 011 
the road, on the day, and at the time of the aceident, 1vith 
the Defendant. at the \\~heeL Sinc.c the child 'vas not seen 
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until th0 time of impact, p erc.opti on time, reaction time 
and braking time must all be computed from that instant. 
Conjecture of tlle expert on this distance is improper 
under t l1 e peculiar f a.et s of this c.as e ~ since they ea n all 
be accurately measured .. They vtere observed by several 
rclia ble witne~ses ~ and intro ducd into evi denc.e I 
Now eonsjdc-r that Defendant had clear,. unobstructed 
vie'v of the point of impact fro:ra,r distance of one hundred 
to one hundred fifty feet ( R . .&j I Based on estimates of 
Defendant's o\vn witnesses~ he could have observed the 
cllild entering the street, at the location of tJw .. ~leph~ 
pole, from a distance of eighty-eight feet (R. 16f" and t" 
17+1 feet from telep~~~ pole to eeTJtcr line, plus 3 feet to 
point of impact (R~ ~ equals 2~23 seconds' time accord-
ing to the expert's estimates+ 2.2 multip1ied by the car's 
speed of 40 feet per second, according to the expert's 
esii.ma~ e8, equals 88 feet). Even if time is computed only 
to the center line, aR the expert erroneously did, the child 
Hb ou ld b ave bceJl. observed from a distance of 76 feet~ 
Considered in the light of the distance Defendant actually 
took following impact, it is apparent that Defendant had 
almost twice the distance required to stop his automobile 
even by the most conservative distance estimate. In such 
a situation, the ·finding of the jury has ll.O support in fact 
It should further bG eonsiderod that the actual time 
taken by Defendant to stop following the accident prob-
ably did not ropresent the minimum distance in which his 
automobile could have stopped~ Evidence is clear and 
uncontradicted that there were no skid ma.tks on the road,. 
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indi(·ating that wheels were not locked and maximJlJ:l 
braking power possibly not taken advantage of (R. -te]. 
THIRD: There was no indication that Defendant's 
attention was oth envise diverted, exc.e pt to the extent 
that he was possibly inattent~Sly watching a pond at the 
side of the road (R .. ~and~-
It is thus apparent that Defendant could have and 
did stop his car in a very short distance~ that he had far 
in excess of the required distance to stop at the time a 
reasonably prudent person acting under these or similar 
circumstances would have taken notice of the infant, and 
that there were not other factors entering in which would 
excuse the Defendant's failure to observe the danger .and 
Htop in time~ Therefore, it cannot logically be contended 
that the Defend ant ~ s negligence,. already establi s lJ ed, was 
not the sole and proximate cause of Plaintiff~s injuries. 
In view of the evidence in this case, even considered in a 
light most favorable to Defendant, reasonable persons 
could not find that defendant was not negligent. 
p OIN'T Ill. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ALLOWING DR4 
HARRIS TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT. 
A. DR. HARRIS DID NOT QUALIFY AS AN 
EXPERT~ AND IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY. 
Before a witness may qualify as an expert., two ele-
ments must be sho\vn: (1) the subject matter of his testi-
mony must be distinctly related to the expert's special 
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field, and must be be~yond the ken of the average layman, 
and (2) the vritncss must have adequate skill in that field. 
See 11rtr.(;f Tr·ust Co. v~ Kw1.Ba.s City T~·i.fe ln.)'. Co~) 79 F. 2d 
48 (8th Cir. 1935) ; F; qnitablf Life _._1ss-ur. /)of:~ v. Da--viH, 
231 A1a .. 261, 184 So. 86 {1935); Goodrich v .. JlJ ay, 121 Ore. 
418, 2 55 ·pH(~. 464 ( 192-7) ~ See also P en·n.syltHJ.-nia Th-resh-
c·rnl-en., etc. In.s. Co. v·. JJf essenger, 181 I\.Id .. 295, 29 l1 .. 2d 
653 ( 1943) j Bebonr v. Kurn~ ~48 :\io. 501~ 154 S. W. 2d 
120 (1941); 6'(tate v. Killeen~ 79 N .. H. 201, 107 Att 601 
(1919). 
~ ... either of these clements are present in the instant 
case. rl.,he Rpeed of a little boy running i~ not he.yond tl1c 
ken of the average person .. Anyone of the jurors could 
have contributed information (~(HH~erni11g tl1e speed of a 
four-year-old '\Vhieh \vould have been just a.s accurate as 
t1w.t of t.lll'! Defenda 11t 's expert. 
Dr. Harris did not have adequate skill to give the 
computations eoncerning the speerl at which a small boy 
runs. On 1)oi.r dire examination Dr. Harris admitted tl1ai.. 
he had rncu ~urcd onl~y himsPlf and aho,y.lJ- dozen othe.rs 
sometime between 1924 and 195;) (R. ~ and ~. On 
cross-cxnrn incttiOTI Dr. lla.rris "-a~ a~ked ,\·hether or not 
he had made any studies concerning the speed of small 
ehildreTl. rr11e doctor's ans\vcr \\··as confined to his own 
children. \V .. hen asked ho\v he had conrluctP.d the 1 Psts on 
his childre1 :, ll~ an:·:nvcred as fol10"\V8: '~Only in this way~ 
1 haven't timed her \Vi th a ~top \Vat ch, for instanr..r., but I 
k.no'v ho'v fast I l1uvc to go to eatch her and I kno\v how 
1\·u:-:t. that goe~ '\vith time rates from o~lns ( sie) times of 
'valking or trotting.~' (R. ~) 
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In this specific area~ the "expert n had no special 
skill.. Any member of the jury, "'~ith children, must have 
H t one time or another noticed tl1c gate and pace of his 
children.. The ',;test t :t \V hj ch Dr.. Harris conducted with 
his children~ the "test" which qualified him as an expert, 
is in reality no test at all, but rather a c.ommon expe-
rience shared by most parents from time to t1me. 
B~ DR. HARRIS ANSWERED HYPOTHETICAL 
QUESTIONS WHICH WERE BASED ON FACTS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE .. 
.... ~s V{as indieated in the argument to Poinl .II, part _A, 
on page 11, Dr. Harris ans,vcrcu a loll g scrie~ of hypo-
fhet1eu1 questions all of 'vhicl1 've-rc based on facts \vhich 
\\"C t'e not part of t.he cvide11r.e of the instant ease. IIi~ 
computations \VOte geared to a hypothr.tieal period of 
time \Vhich \vas about half the amount of time actually 
established by eviden.ee .. It is clear that the facts assumed 
in a. hypothetical question must be supported by evidenc-e 
in the ease. See, e. g~, Trouf:.rna-n v+ 1l-lu.tu.al Life ins Co., 
12~"S F•. 2d 769 ( 6tlt Cir .. 1 942); 1~akotna Park Ba~nk v . .. A_b-
bott, 17fl Aid .. 249, 19 A. 2d 169 ( 1941) ~ 
A.s \Vas indicated on page 16~ the eompntations on 
the basis of one second \Vere misleading and confusing+ 
The point of t ltj s exception is t.hat U1is t._~~ timony Vlas also 
in error since it \VaR based on hypothetical far.ts not sur}-
ported by evidenee, viz~, one seoond rather than t'vo+ 
PorNT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT~s INSTRUCTION NO. 9 IS ER-
RONEOUS, :MISLEADINGJ CONFUSING, AND IS IN 
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ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SET FORTH THE COR-
RECT STANDARD. 
By ihe DufeTlda.n t 's ov..Tn t.e~ t1mony he is negligent 
either in not looking or in looking and failing to see that 
'vhic.l! 'vas clearly visible~ See authorities cited on 
page 8. 
Sinc.o the defendant's negligence in not seeing the 
child is obvious, the only basis upon V~-'"hieh one may sup-
port the verdiet of the jury in this ease is that Defend-
ant ~s negligence v.ras not the proximate cause of Plain~ 
tiff's injury. Phillips v. Creighton, 211 Ore~ 645, 316 P. 
2d 302 (1957). 
In Instruction 9 the Court instructs the jury as to 
pl'oximate cause as follo\vs: 
''You are instructed that where the alleged 
negligent act .of a. driver of an automobile e011 s1 stg 
of an omission of duty suddenly and unexpectedly 
atising, it is incumbent 011 tl1c plaintiff to 8how 
that the circumstances "Y~o\'ere such that th-e driver of 
the ftu.fontobile had a11. opporlu·n-ity to becom-e con-
scious of th-e fact .. r; giving rise to the duty, and a 
reasonable opportunity to perform such, before he 
can be held liable on the ground of negligence~ In 
th<.! event, therefore, you shall find from the evi-
denee in this case that.. the defendarn-ts did not~ 'With-
out negligence on their part, have sufficient time, 
by reason of s-u.dd en and un..p_a;p ected cond·u..ct on the 
part of plai1~tiff, if such there was~ to become eon-
S(~iuus .of the fact that plaintiff intended to or 
would \valk or ruu into the high,vay, if such he did~ 
a.·nd rhd not have time thereafter to avoid tlu:: acci-
dent 1 ·you are ins true. ted tlla t your v~ rdict. should 
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be in favor of defendants, no cause of action~" 
(~~nlJlhasis added) 
This instruction is confusing and was undoubtedly mif;-
leatling to tl1e jury~ This in itself should be persua~ive 
reason for this Court to reverse. However, the instruction 
is subjeet t.o far greater error in that the proper standard 
·w·as not given to the jury. It is clear that by universal 
authority that t.he proper standard to be applied in ncgli~ 
gence cases is the reason-ably prudent 1na-n rJcting under 
simlilar circumstwnces. 
The Supreme Court. of Utah has on ma.n·y oecasions 
set forth the proper standard to be applied in negligence 
cases. In Lasagna v. ~fcCfNtihy, 111 l~lalJ 269, 177 .~.\~ 2d 
734 (194"7 ), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 829~ the Court stated 
the rule to be as follows! 
'' ~Togligonce .. ~ is 'the omission to do some-
thit1g which a reason.able person, guided by those 
considerations \V hich ordinarily regulate the eon-
duct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of 
!50mething which a pr·u.dent person under like cir-
cumstances. would not do. '' (Emphasis added) 
Again in La·w-rence v. Barnberger R. R~, 3 Utah 2d 247, 
282 P. 2d 335 ( 1955) the Court indicat.cd that the standard 
of care to be applied was the reasonable and prudent per-
son under the eirc.umstances. 
See a1so Powell v. Bartrnes3, 139 Ca.L .. ~.pp. 394, 294 
P. 2d 150 1956); Phillips v. Creighton, 211 Ore. 645, 316 
P. 2d 302 (1957); lV-alker v. Pe'I1Mcr, 190 Ore~ 542, 227 P. 
2d 316 (1951); F!enper v. Vancouver-Portln-nd Bu.s Co.!f 
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209 ()re~ 37,. :104 P .. 2d 448; Blyth v. Bir1n.i'Jt.gha'i'n lVate-r-
1A}orks c:o~~ 11 Exchequer 781 (1856) ; Osborne v. j}f o-nt-
gontery_t 203 "\Vis. ~23, 234 I\. \~V. 3"72 ( 1931.) ('"'ordinary 
prudent" man) ; TV a·rr·in-gto·n. v ~ ·[..,: eu~ York Pott~er & Light 
C!orp4, 252 Appr Div~ 364, 300 NYS 154 (193"7) (''typical 
prvdent" n1an) ; C h-arb onea;u v . .Jl a.cllury, 84 X~ ll~ 501, 
153 1\.tL 457 (1931) ("average person of ordinary pru-
dence''); Restaternent, :£oris ~283 (1948 Supp .. ). 
A rea ding of Instruction No~ 9 vlill discloRe no stand-
ard other than the Defendant himself. Tn effect the trial 
Court made the Ilefendant the judge of his own actions. 
The Court exp1·essly inst1·ucted the jury that if thuy found 
that the Defendant did not have sufficient time because of 
the sudden and unexpected conduct of the Plaintiff to be-
come conHtio•Js of t.hc faet il1at the Plaintiff intended to or 
\Vould walk lnto the highway and did not have time ther(;~ 
after to avoid tl1c aceidcr1t then the verdir.t should be 
in favor of the Defendant. Nothing is said eoncerni11g 
~,-vhether or 11ot a reasonably prudent man aeti ng 11nd.er 
t.ht~He or sitnila1· eircumf.itaneeR "\Vould have had sufficient 
time because of the sudden and unexpected <'OH(hH~t. of the 
Plai nti IT to llC(~.omc eonRriou~ nf the rl3nger and suffieient 
time thereafter to avoid the aecidentr The trial court lim-
ited the jury to a consideratior1 of tltc subjective reality of 
the sjtua{ion. rl,}u~y· \Vere asked to COllRider Vlhether OT 
not the specific Defendants in the instant case did in fact 
have &Juffie.ient. time, in vie\v of the Plaintiff~s nets,. to 
avoid the accilh~nt.. T·hc HilS\,·cr to sucl1 a. question is 
~lf eourse obvious to anyone cognizant of the actual result4 
~ro jury is needed to pass upon such a question. The 
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ans,ver i~ the very fact 'vhieh gave rise to this action. The 
I)<) t'(lndn nt did not have time to become conscious of the 
dau~(~r; he did not even see the child, in plain and UJlOb-
st ru('t Pd vi P \V ; he in fact hit the el1ild, and reasonable 
p~ .. r~ons (•(nlld 110t possibly conclude that the Defendant. 
in fact c.ould have a voided tl•c ac.cident under the facts 
as tlu ~ y exist. 
"\~V-hat the Defendant in fact had time to pereeive a.nu 
thus act upOil is llOt important to his liability.. The trial 
Court \ron [tlllavc been eloser to the correct standard if it 
had phrn~t~tl the jnstrnetion in terrns of \Vhat the defend-
ant .~·h011ld ha·ue l1ad time t.o do. ~~veu this 'vould have 
been ineorree.t, however, for U1 e t e :-5t or Dt~ i'c~ nda n l 's 1 ia-
bility is \\rhether a reasonable and prudent marl aet.ing 
under these or similar circumstances "\\~o nld have seen tl• e 
child in time to perceive the danger and avoid it. 
It seems obvious tlnti. the Defendant i~ not nc(_~.essarily 
Uu~ reasonably prudent man \vhieh the law ~o often refnr~ 
to. ""'As everyone k:no1vs, this reasonable man i~ a crea-
ture of tl•e la1v's imagination. He is an. abstraction. He 
ha~ long been the subj cct of homely phrase 3 .. nd \vi tty epi-
gram. 11 e is n-u 11'HM:'~ -tcho has ever !-iF er.l and -is ·'not lo b c 
hl en tified ·H~·ith. am.:r; o·n-e of the parties nor \vith .any mem-
ber of the jury. ' ' (Emphasis add cd) 2 I-I a.·rp er a-1-1 d J a·m es, 
The LmJJ o.f Torts 902 (1 n56). 
In the case of Lo·uiscillr (e 1\T. Rr R. v. Goiver, 85 rrer1n. 
46;)~ 3 s~ W. 824 ( 1887) the coutt iT•structed the jUT)" that 
the standard \vas t.he reasonably prudent ma11 and then 
\vent on to equate this standard with the jurors them-
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selves. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee states 
as follov~rs: 
.: 'The (~ourt~ after telling the jury that 'it v.ras 
t.he duty or plaintiff to exercise such a degree of 
eare in making the coupli11g as a man of ordinary 
prudence \vould have done,' adds ~ 'Just sue.h care 
das one of you, similar I y employed, \vould have 
exercised m1der such circumstances. If he exer-
eiscd tl1at degree of care, and was nevertheless 
injured, he is untitled to your verdict Tf he failed 
to exercise that degree of eare, he c.annot reQ.over.' 
The eharge~ as to exercise of such care as a man 
of ordinary prudenee would have done, V\~"as cor~ 
rect, but it \vas thought not fu1l enough by the 
,Judge, who illustrated \vhat he meant hy reference 
to the eare which each one of the jurymen would 
have exercis od~ His charge~ so limited~ was erro-
neous~ It. docs not appear tl1at all of the members 
of the jury were men of ordinary prudence, and 
y·ct the Judge tells tl1em tl1at 'vhat he moans l)y 
the exercise of such care as a man of ordinary pru~ 
dene.e would have exercised is that it v.ras the exer-
cise of sueh earc as one of tlu~ro would l1aYu uxer-
cised if similarly situated .... The care that he was 
required to exercise was that of a ma~ of ordinary 
ptudc:uco in that dangerous situation, and not 'jusl 
such c.are as one of the jury, similarly situated, ' 
\\o'"ould have done~ be tl1at mueh or little, as each 
member might be very prudent or Yery im-
prudent.'~ 
See al~o .Aecurd: Tl7 a--r-rington- v. AT etc York Power££ [;ight 
(Jorp., 252 A pp. Div~ 364, 300 NYS 154 (1937); IJ!ayor & 
Co·u.n.cil of Antericu.'} Y. Johnso'ity 2 Ga. App. 378, 58 S. E. 
518 (1907); (!olem-a-n. v~ Allen~ 79 Ga .. 643, 5 S .. E. 204 
(1888); Rroyles v. Prisock, 97 Ga. 643, 25 S. F1. 389 
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(1896) ; Carlson v. She·n~alter, 110 CaL App. 655,. 243 P. 2d 
349 (1952)~ 
The authority jg ample to the effect that the trial 
court commits a reversible error 'vhen it equates the rea-
sonably prudent man "\vith the nte1nbers of the jury. It 
seems obvious that reverRihle error is committed when 
the reasonable man is equated 'With one of the parties or 
when no standard \V hatsoever is given~ 
In the case of Correia v~ Betmett, 199 Ore. 374, 261 
P. 2d 851 (1953} the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed 
the trial r.ourt because of an instruction w hic.h r..ompletely 
overlooked the standard of eare required of the defend-
ant.. That standard 'vas, of course, as the Court indicated, 
the care v-.Thich 'VIlOu1d haYe been exercised by a reasonably 
prudent person under similar circumstances~ 
In Garner v. Scott, 225 } .. _tk 042~ 286 S. '\V. 2-d 481 
(1956} the trial court~s instruction in question read in 
part as follows : 
"' 'rrf you find] that it beramP nee.r.sRary, and 
it appeared to the defendant Scott at the tine, 
acting as a reasonable person, that it v.raA neces-
sary to defend hiinself, a;;ul he d-i-d so by dri.·r-ing 
his truck in-to the car occupied by plaintiffs in 
orde-r to prevent bodily harm to himself or dant-
a.ge to the truck, then you are instructed that he 
'vas justified in doing so, and you "'ill find the 
issues in favor of the defendants.' n (Emphasis 
added by Supreme Court) 
Because of this instruction, the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas reversed the case and in doing so stated as follows: 
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(. ''l•le :fhl(] nothing "\Vrong with the first por-
tioTl of the .instruction do"W"Tl to the part it.alieizcd, 
but as it no\v stands it amounts to the court telling 
l.he ju1·y that Scott has a right to do exa-ctly ~That 
he did not. In otl1e:r "\VOl·ds IJlstruction No. 7 prac~ 
tically made Seot.t t.he judge of ~That to do to pro~ 
teet himself and did not, a~ it. should l1a vr, requiTe 
him to use only such means aB were necessar-y 
under the circumstances to prevent harm, or, act-
ing as a reaHonably prudent person, to have tried 
to a.vnid harm to himself in some other \vay. '' 
The \\reight of authority holds that a.n object'it~e. rea-
sonable man test is applied in so far as mental a11d <!mO-
tional cha.racterigtics are concerned. See .2 II arper and 
James 1 The La·w of Torts 923 (1956); Prosser, Torts 126 
( 2d ed. 1955) ~ 
"Tl.1c- laVt;. takes no account of i:he infinite variety of 
temperament~ intellect and ed uc.a.ti nn \Vhieh make the 
ir1 tern al eh a r a.et c r of n given a.ct so different in di ffcrent 
1ncn." I1 ol·mes,. 1 1he Co1nmon. La-tl) 108 ( 1881) ~ 
The Supreme (~ourt of lTtal~ in tho eaHe of A-nde·rson. 
v. R in.gham, &!: (Ja.r_f ield 1 r. y., 117 Utah 197, 214 P ~ 2d 60 7 
(1950) q_uoted vrith approval tl1e follo,,·i_ng statement 
from J a"fn-ts J ~ast Clea•r (! h.n-nte ~~ A. 1rra-nsitional Doc-
tri-'ne, 4'7 Yale L. J. 704 (1937) ~ 
" 'A man's eonduct at any giYeu point of time 
is to he judged in the light of what would then be 
possible to the standard ma1~ in his situation. Of 
eolJrse, even this requires impossibilities of the 
substandard person~ but OlLly to the extent that his 
individual shortcomings are dis·regardcd.' , , 
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In the case of F:/oda v. JJ arriott, 118 Cal. 1\_pp. 635:t 
5 P .. 2d G75, G77 (1931) the trial court's instrnction: 
0 
':rrongfully lin1i1 s t.l1c eon~ideratioll of the 
jury to such evidcnec ord~y as tends to shu'v '~'hat 
a.t-t ua.J kn.owledge of the danger of the Aituation the 
driver of the automobile had at the time of the 
accident~ N egligenee may he adequately sho,~·n hy 
proof of the faet that tho driver of an a utomo bile 
failed to exerciRe t.h fl l. degree of vigilance i 11 the 
operation of the vrh icle "\Vhich an o rdin.arily pru-
tfe·n1 pet·son should have used under similar cir-
cumstances, even tholJgh it also appears that the 
driver had no actual knov{ledge of thP danger.'' 
( ~~mphasi~ added) 
Tl1is ease involved facts similar to the instant ease i11 that 
a small ehild \VfLS injured and the jury returned a verdiet 
of no cause of action. The caRe \\ras reversed because of 
the erroneous in~truction on proximate cause .. 
It is also important to note that~· .. I .. The prejudicial 
error of this instruction 'vas not avoided by the fH(·1. that. 
1 l1 c jury was else,v here c.orrcetly instructed ... '' )..S.oda- v. 
J!larri-fJtt, supra at 67'7~ Ser. alf.;O Carlson v~ She·u)alter~ 
110 CaL _A pp. 65fl, 24R P. 2d 549 (1952) I 
The only reasOl'lable theory upon "\Vhich one can jus-
t.] f'y the verdict rct.urned by the jury j n the instant ease i::; 
tl!at the Defendant's negligence v,-rru:; not the proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. In vie'v of the erroneous 
jn~truction as to proximate cause, tho jn ry \vas not prop-
erJy guided in their conside1~ation of the most important. 
fact in the instant ease.. The judgment of the Court en-
tered on the jury ts verdict should be reverscd4 
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POlKT v. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS TO PARAGRAPH NO. 2, INSTRUCTION 
NO .. 3, IN THAT DEFINING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE ABSTRACTLY IS CONFUSING AND MISLEAD-
ING TO THE JURY AND RAISES AN INFERENCE 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEG .. 
LIGENT. 
Because of the fact that t l1 e Plaintiff ·\vaH a very young 
child, the defense of contributory negligence was not ap-
plicable in this case. See Morb~11 v .. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 
252 P. 2d 231 (1953); Ka.u}aguch·i v. Betvnett, 112 Utah 
442~ 189 P .. 2-d 109 (1948). The trial judge nevertheless 
instructed t.he jury abstractly as to the meaning of the 
term'' contributory negligence.'' It is clea.r that the c.ourt 
should avoid j11st.rur..tions in the abstract form and refuse 
to give req11ested instructions even though correct unless 
they a.re made applicable to the issues in the car-;e. See 
J. I. F. U. xv (1957} (give only when necessary and ap-
plicable) ; :JB Atn. J·u.f~, N e.gligence ~370. 
In the case of Herndon v. 8aJt Lake C,it.y, 34 "C"tah 
65, 95 Pac. 646 (1908), the Utah Court stated as follows: 
"""\Vhile the inst rue~ ion correctly sta te.s an abw 
s t.ract proposition of la-v~- ...... it is wb o11y ina pplic-
able to tlu_~ f.tJ.clt.s as developed in this case ...... 
Instructions should in all cases apply tlu~ law to 
the exi:->ting i'ati~ and r.ircumstaneest and in eases 
of negligence, ~'"here the duty varies vrith the con-
ditions, a mere general statement of the law with 
regard to the duty generally imposed is, if pos~ 
siblc, V{Orse than not to instruct at all." 
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1\~aiu in Pett~~-son v . .. '·lor(~n-sr.n, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12 
( 1. n:~7), the Utah Court advised that the jury should be 
confined by the i r1structions given to a consideration of 
the negligence cl•a rged and ~upported by prooL 
d The failure to so limit the jury in its delib-
erations has been, Ly the uniform holding of this 
court, held to be prejudicial error.'' Peterson- v~ 
Sore·nsenr .~upra, at 65 P .. 2d 17. 
Since there was no po8~tbility that Plaintiff in the 
instant case could be held responsible for his arts, the 
instruction defining contributory negligenee served no 
proper purpose. Contributory negligence vlas in no "'Tay 
part of tl1is ta~c~ It was not charged, a.nd as a matter of 
la'vt no evidence c.ould be r--anstrucd to sub~ lan tia te s ueh 
a defense. Whether or not such a defense existed at 
all 1\ras no concern of the jury in this ease. The instruC-
tion could only mislead and eonfuse the jury, and it \vas 
thus erroneous .. 
PO.lKT VI~ 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NO~ 8) NO~ 9, 
NO. 10 AND NO. 11 ARE ERRONEOUS, CONFUSING, 
AND MISLEADING AND IN ERROR BECAUSE THEY 
PLACE UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THE PLAINTIFF~S 
PART IN THE INCIDENT AND INFER THAT THE 
ACCIDENT WAS INEVITABLE. 
The trial Court's Instruction No .. 8 is very diffieult 
to comprehend. )iany thoughts are run together in one 
single instruction. If the trial Judge had stopped after 
instructing the jury as to their duties should they find 
the Plaintiff to be the sole proximate cause, then it would 
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not have been a. bad instruetion~ Ho1vcvc r, the trial 
Judge went on to talk about foreseeability in a rather 
poeuliar content, a.nd ended the 1n~truetion with a 
tl1ongl1t .on intervening acts. The net result. is an instl'!le-
i.[on \\~hirh is very confu~ing to 0110 trained in the }a,v, let 
alone the laymen to ~rhom it "\Vas directed. 
'rho rule of forescca1Jj}jty in negligence cases 1s ge11~ 
erally applied in regard to the damages incurred and not 
the eonduct of a party. T'ro.sscr, To-rts 110 (2t1 cd. 1955). 
TluJ sc ve n~ l j urisd i ei.i o :n ~ d.i:ffe1· as to "'Thether gen~ 
eral d.amageR must be foresee1J, P~rossr:r, Torts at 260 1 
whether the specific injury must be foreseen~ P-rosser~ 
T·o-rts at 259, or whether the negliger.1t pcr8on \Vill be 
liable for all of the damage directly flowing from his neg-
li.gCTlt a<~t, Pro.s·swr, 1 1o1"is at :JSb'. Foreseeability in the 
Y{ay it is used by the trial eourt had no applicatioTl to 
the faet..s of t.}J i~ ease. Of r.ourse~ tlle Defendant. e.ould 
not perceive that the Plainti !T ,~·0uld run out upon the 
street bGfoTe he l1ad done RO. Once he }1 ad done so~ how-
ever, there v.ras nothing to {or·(~~re. It wast rather, a 
matter .of seei11g.. Ir the Plaintiff hHd been standing at 
the si ~ 1 u of th~ road in full viU\\T of tl1e Defendant and had 
8uddenly darted itno Defendant'~ path~ then the doctrine 
of forest~( ~a hility \Vould be pc rti n (~ n L See, e. 9~, P a-schka 
v. (:arste·n. 1 231 To,va 1185:- :1 N. W. 2d 542 (1942) ; Disa.rc"k 
v~ S·i·n.qer Talk-i-ng .J.liach. Co., 185 Wis~ 92, 200 N~ W. 675 
( 1924}; Gui,llory v. Ilorecky: 185 La~ 21 ~ 168 So. 481 
(19J6} j J11 etts' .A.d·ttt.-_tr v. Loifi.ru~·i.Ue Gas & Elec. Co., 222 
I{y. 551, 1 S~ \'l~ 2d 985 (1928). \Ve would then ask 
\rlt<li lJer 1 he Defendant had a. rigl1t to Hssume that the 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff \VOuld remain on the side of the road, or 
'vhether, realizing the Plaintiff 'va::; a small child, the 
defendant should reaAonahly have foreseen that he 'vould 
(in rt into the .~ t reet. If the jury decided upon tb e latter, 
then they eould quite properly find that the defendant 
~hould have foreseen the damage \vhich resuitcd and thu~ 
should have traveled at a speed ~Nhicll \Vould have al-
lu?{ed him to prevent the ar~.idcnt.. The actual facts of 
the instant case are quite different, ho,vever. From the 
instant Defendant had an opportunity to view Plaintiff 
in the instant case, PI aintiff v.ras pursuing hir.; course 
aeross the road. The Defendant testified that he did 
not see Pia i.ntiff w·i t.h t.he exception of a blur at the time 
of impact. It is obvious that Defendant vlas negligent 
either in not looking or in looking and not seeing. It. is 
not a question of foreseeing hut rather one of seeing. Of 
course, the question remains as t.o whether Defendant's 
negligcnct~ \vas the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury. 
That is., could a reasonable man under similar circum-
stancef{ have avoided tl1c accident even if he had seen the 
plaintiff at the earliest opportunity. This, however, 1H 
a matter of phy~ical fae.t .and has nothing vthatsoever to 
do \vith forseeability .. 
r:Jihc term "intervening .a.ct'j is also a term -with a 
te-ehnirA 1 meaning, Prosst-r, Torts 266 (2d ell~ 1955). The 
acts of Plaintiff in the instant c.aso \Vere not intervening 
ones. If Plaintiff had n.ot boCil a small ehild, then hjs 
acts mny very well have contributed to the cause in such 
a way as to bar his recovery. The PI aintiff' s ac.t.s could 
not be considered intervening ones under any rationale, 
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since an intervening act is one which comes into opera-
tion producing the result after the defendant's negli-
gence has occurred. This may be illustrated by an 
examle.. If a bystander had rushed into the street to save 
David and in pushing him from danger had injured him, 
then we 'vould call this third person an intervening cause 
and the question would then cone-ern the extent of Defend-
ant's obligation. See Shafer v~ Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 
Utah 46, 234 Pac. 300 (1925). 
Perhaps the best objection which one can make t.o 
this instruction is that it is so c.onfusing that it is not 
under sta.ndable either in a technica 1 or a general sense .. 
. A.t bost it could only misload the jury .. 
Wben Instruction No .. 8 is read in conjunction with 9 
and 10 the error is multiplied. lilstruetion No. 8, if it 
does nothlng more, conveys some thought concerning 
the Plaintiff being thesole proximate cause. Instruction 
No. 9 again mentions the ''sudden and unexpected con-
duct on the part of plaintiff.'' Instruction No~ 10 once 
again redundantly conveys the thought that this might 
be an inevitable accident which no one r,ould have pre~ 
vented. Instruction 1~o. 11 seems to rub it in by advising 
the jury that th a aceident itself is no evidence of the 
negligence of the defendants. 
Even if these instructions had been technically cor-
rect the combination them, one after the other, all im-
plicit 'vith thoughts co nee rning the fault of the Plaintiff 
( "\Vh i ch 'vas not even to be considered unless it was the 
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sole and only cause of the accident) a.nd the inevitable-
ness of the accident, constituted a reversible reror. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant"s negligence is established as a mat-
ter of la,v. The verdict of the jury is clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. The trial judge committed nu~ 
merous reversible errors. The verdict constitutes a mis-
carriage of justice a.nd should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSE~T AND j,:fiLLER, and 
P ARI{ER M. NIELSON 
Coun-sel for Appellfltnts 
5245 South State Street 
1furray, Utah 
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